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With wild yells and withering volleys the rebel advance, both front and flank, continued. At this moment old Jubal Early's troops must have realized wishes little short of the magic lamp—for on the open grey coated soldiers, on full horses and high with the hope of at last annihilating the Yankee army. The Nineteenth corps, however, stood firm for some time longer, although outflanked and outnumbered. The Yankee and cannon were being driven rapidly away in a westerly direction. The greater part of General Cook's command again had fallen into the hands of the rebels in an early stage of the battle. The Sixth corps had come up from their position on the right. It was then under the command of Brigadier-General James B. Ricketts.

General Wright, on seeing the Nineteenth corps so completely outflanked, ordered both the Sixth and the Nineteenth corps to fall back to some rising ground on the west side of the small stream already mentioned in the former part of this report. The Sixth corps covered the retreat, and gave the Nineteenth and 8th corps ample time to cross the stream when the Nineteenth went into position on the right, the Sixth in the centre, and the eighth on the left.

During the time the Sixth corps was crossing the stream, General Ricketts was struck in the right breast by a bullet, and was compelled to leave the field, when General Getty assumed command. The wound was a very dangerous one, but the ball has since been extracted at Winchester, and the General is progressing very favorably. He is accompanied by Captain Richards, of his staff. The line above described was held some time under a terrific fire from the rebel artillery. Early's infantry, however, crossed the stream and again came into action; for upwards of ten minutes the musketry rolled continuously, and the losses on both sides were great. Our line at that time was facing almost due east. Again however, it fell back, but this time in a soldierly and splendid style.

The principal efforts of the rebels were directed towards our left flank, which occupied a thickly timbered piece of ground. The cavalry divisions of Generals Custer and Merritt were sent around to strengthen this point, while the Nineteenth and 8th corps swung slowly back, the left being the pivot on which the line swung. A short time before this movement was executed, a musket ball had struck Major-General Wright on the chin. It was a flesh wound, and for some time afterwards bled very freely. Gen. Wright made very light of his injury, and continued on the field, close up to his main line of battle, during the whole day.

The effort made by the rebels to break our left and centre was terrible. There seemed to be no cessation to the pelting of the combatants and the roar of artillery and musketry. Shortly after nine o'clock, Custer's and Merritt's cavalry got to work on the enemy's flank, when for a time, their advance was checked; but the artillery was never silent.

During the entire day the enemy handled their guns with great rapidity and precision—a fact which we can vouch for by scores near whom their iron compliments were buried unpleasantly close. The next position chosen was on the crest of a hill considerably higher than the one which had just been vacated. Early had already driven us several miles, and we were then between two and three miles from the Winchester and Strasburg turnpike. The rebels however, seemed determined to push their advantage to the utmost and again they directed their principal efforts towards our left flank. The position last occupied was not destined to be held for any length of time, as an order was shortly afterwards received to retreat by right of column to take up a new position. Had the order been carried out, and the retreat continued, the army would doubtless have struck the turnpike in the vicinity of Newtown. But the retreat was not destined to take us so far, for the battle was about to be turned, and the advancing rebel column driven back, routed and demoralized.

ANOTHER RETREAT

It was now about half-past ten o'clock in the morning. Long lines of infantry had commenced to file off through the woods, and battle was apparently over for a time.

The wagons had been passed down the road to Winchester with but slight loss, though the rebels had made several desperate efforts to secure so valuable a prize as the wagon train of the Union army.

The results of the contest were otherwise gloomy. We had been surprised and driven out of a splendid position; had lost multiplyingly in prisoners; had lost twenty-four pieces of artillery, thirty-four ambulances, including all the medical wagons and medical supplies of the Nineteenth corps, and several headquarter wagons. We had yielded more than two miles of the battle-field to the enemy; many of our finest officers were killed and disabled, and the killed and wounded were thick around.

A CHANGE IN THE SCENE.

A lull. The enemy, relinquishing his attack, contented himself with a lively use of artillery. At this moment a faint cheer echoed along the line in the rear. General Sheridan, who had ridden post haste from Winchester, was approaching.—His appearance created wild enthusiasm. Beginning at the left of the line he rode along the whole front of the army, waving his hat amid uproarious cheers. Retreat was stopped in an instant from that time until 3 p. m. Every nerve was strained to get the army into an offensive position, and, at 3 o'clock, the whole army, the Sixth corps in the centre, the Nineteenth corps on the right, Crook's command on the left, Merritt's cavalry division on the extreme left, Custer's division on the extreme right, made a magnificent, resistless charge, which swept the enemy off the face of the earth before it everywhere.

The enemy had actually begun to throw up breastworks, and was preparing to go into camp when this charge was made. He was driven back at a double-quick through Middletown, across Cedar run, where he came from, and was thence pursued by our cavalry through and beyond Strasburg. Forty-three pieces of his artillery, some guns taken from us during the day, were captured at Strasburg; also, over a hundred wagons and ambulances, and caissons innumerable. The rebel General Ramseur was captured in an ambulance, seriously, if not mortally, wounded. Probably one thousand prisoners were picked up along the road. Two hours of daylight would have given us the rebel army almost entire. Any just estimate of our own losses or those of the enemy is at present impossible. The army is ordered to move against the enemy at 5 A. M. to-morrow.

THE EXPEDITION INTO LURAY VALLEY.

The *Herald* has a long letter from its correspondent who accompanied the expedition of destruction sent by Sheridan into the Luray Valley. We take two paragraphs from it:

The orders of General Sheridan to Colonel Powell were to destroy all flouring mills, barns, grain factories, and to drive off all live stock and cattle that he found on his route of march. On Sunday, the 2d instant, Colonel Powell broke camp and moved to the town of Luray. As the troops passed by, they found every grain of provender confiscated and also at hand for the passage of the Yankee train. The owners scampered for the night at Luray. While at the latter town, Colonel Powell ordered the destruction of several large and stocked with hay and grain. While several of the men were engaged in this duty, one of them, a private of the Eighth Ohio cavalry, was seized by two rebels and murdered in cold blood—his throat being cut from ear to ear. The body of the soldier was found the next day, and a careful investigation was made as to the cause of his death, with the above conclusion.

The result of the expedition was the capture of six thousand fine head of cattle, five hundred horses, the destruction of thirty-two large flouring mills, thirty distilleries, four blast furnaces, and upwards of fifty barns.

[Correspondence of the Mobile Advertiser.]

LETTER FROM THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE.

JACKSONVILLE, ALA., Oct. 10, 1864.

I arrived at this place yesterday from "the front," having left the army on the morning of the 11th inst. * * * I gave you my views of it in a letter written on the 20th of September, before the campaign commenced. In one point my advice was not followed, and our cause suffered by it. I left the army on the 11th, having that morning received an order detaching me from my command, and assigning me to Jacksonville. I find the change a delightful one, from the hard march and short rations of an active campaign to the quiet and luxurious repose of a hospitable mansion, presided over by a charming and noble matron, and furnishing such rare delights as a bountiful and excellent table, a beautiful chamber, a bed of the softest down, and the cleanest and whitest sheets! So glorious is it to be detached from the army and be master of one's own time. How long this elysium will continue, I know not, but I hope it may be long. I must, at least, admit that I have been treated with "distinguished consideration"

Where the army is I cannot tell you, for indeed I do not precisely know. I left it near a place called Dirt town, (Phoebus what a name!) and its face was then northward, and its legs in motion. I hope it may safely return, but I fear that the bold and vigilant Sherman may deal it a heavy blow before the campaign is ended.

I am estopped from telling you what is past, but I can give you my speculations about the future. I do not know what our Generals will do, or attempt to do, but I know very well what they can, and what they cannot do. I therefore give you my views of the future operations in this quarter.

Our people are a weak and foolish people.—They are too easily and too excessively depressed, or exalted in spirit. A disaster drives them to despair and a little success exalts them into ecstasies and the most extravagant expectations. When Atlanta was lost, they were depressed as if the blow was irreparable, and now that our army has taken the aggressive and regained lost territory, they are wild with hope, and are deluded with the idea that our army will go triumphantly forward into the heart of Tennessee and Kentucky. I regret to have to spoil this pleasing vision. What then, is the situation?—Our recent move was, no doubt, a surprise to Sherman, though he soon discovered it, and responded to it. He was obliged to move back to meet it, and under great disadvantages. It is believed that his army at Atlanta had been dismissed by many thousands. One corps had been discharged from service, one corps and two divisions had been sent after Forrest, two divisions had been sent to Kentucky to recruit, and one corps had been sent to Rome.

Sherman's teams were poor and weak, and unfit for traveling. And we must have had the start of him, by two or three days. This railroad would have given him some advantage, but we were on it, and commanded it. What to do with Atlanta was an embarrassing question. He had either to abandon it altogether, and lose his sick and wounded, and his accumulated stores there, or to leave a garrison. To leave a garrison there, was to diminish his army in the field, and, perhaps, finally to sacrifice the garrison.—But political considerations controlled military policy, and he left a garrison of about 7,000 men in Atlanta. Having sacrificed so much to gain Atlanta, its political value to Lincoln in the pending election, and, indeed, Sherman's own vanity, induced him to take great hazards, and make great sacrifices to hold it, even for a few weeks. With the remainder of his arms he returned, as readily as he could, towards Kingston and Rome. On the 12th inst., after leaving our army, I passed in ten miles of Rome. My opinion is, that on that day, Sherman's army was at Rome. It was impossible for him to have been further North at that time.

The theatre of war in this department is henceforth to be on new lines. Our move already made, transfers it from Atlanta to the country between Blue Mountain and the Atlanta and Chattanooga railroad. Atlanta will never again be the scene of conflict. Here, over this mountainous country, or upon any other line farther west, the war for the possession of Tennessee, Georgia and Alabama will be fought out.

It is of much interest, then, to know the localities, distances and topography of this region, which is to become historical by this struggle.—The distance from Atlanta to Rome is about 60 miles; to Dalton, 100; to Chattanooga, 140.—The distance from Blue Mountain to Rome is 58 miles; to Kingston, 70; to Dalton, 75; to Chattanooga, 104; to Bridgeport, 85; to Huntsville, 95. The topography of the country is rugged and mountainous, with many streams and bad roads. This region contains four rivers, the Chattahoochee, the Coostanaula, and the Tennessee. The first flows in seven miles of Atlanta, and thence to West Point. The two latter unite at Rome, and form the Coosa, which flows southward to Montgomery. The Coosa is navigable for steamboats from Greensport to Rome. The Tennessee flows by Chattanooga and Bridgeport, near Hunstsville. It is necessary to understand the topography of this region in order to know what can be done by our Generals in future operations on this line.

There are many who think that our army is now on its triumphant march to Tennessee or Kentucky, and that it will not halt or turn back. I cannot believe it, for I believe such a movement impracticable. Whence will such an army draw its supplies? It cannot draw them from Blue Mountain—the head of the Alabama and Tennessee railroad from Selma—because the distance is too great, and the line of communication is commanded by the enemy. It cannot subsist on the country, for the only condition upon which this would be possible, would be a cantonment of the troops, and the absence of an enemy. In the presence of an enemy, the army must remain massed, and cannot subsist on any territory limited by its own lines. It would, in a few days, exhaust the richest portions of Tennessee, and be compelled to constant change of position. And it must be remembered that the season for military operations is now past. The rigors of winter are now upon our halfclad, shivering army, and it is unprepared for the severities of a winter campaign. The streams will soon be swollen and the roads blocked up by mud. Therefore, I do not believe that such a campaign is practicable, or will be attempted. Some think that our army will shift its base to the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, and be thus supplied by that road and the road from Memphis to Decatur or Stevenson.—This is not practicable. That line is too near the Yankee lines to be secure or reliable. The Yankees can advance from many points upon it and destroy it—from Vicksburg, from Memphis, from Nashville, Murfreesboro, Tullahoma, and, indeed, from any point between Stevenson and Nashville. This road is cut by a perpendicular one from Nashville. Besides, our possession of Mobile is very precarious, and its fall would cut us off from that base. That route would not do. It is too near the Yankee lines, too open to attack, and too easy of destruction. It follows, then, that a recovery of Tennessee, this winter is not at all probable.

There are three lines by which we can assail the Yankees if they remain in Georgia. The first is by the road terminating at Blue Mountain; the second is by the Mobile and Ohio railroad, and the third the East Tennessee road, from Virginia to Chattanooga. The second will not do for the reasons already stated. The third will not do, because, besides being insecure, and liable to attack, it is too long and indirect a line to supply an army. Virginia is exhausted and cannot supply an army. The other States are too remote to supply an army by this route.

The only practicable line is that by Blue Mountain. It is far from the enemy's lines, and is protected from assault by rivers and mountains. It is, therefore, secure and reliable. Therefore it is, in my opinion, the best line of operations. Still it has some disadvantages. Its terminus is too far from the enemy's line to serve as a convenient base for us. The distance from Blue Mountain to the Yankee line of communication in Georgia, the Chattanooga and Atlanta railroad, is about 70 miles. This is five days' march, and is only practicable in tolerable weather and roads. Our army cannot remain nearer the enemy's line than Blue Mountain. Our operations, then, must, for the present, be limited to frequent raids upon his railroad. In five days we can reach his railroad; in five days we can destroy it for thirty miles, and in five days return.

Thus, we can make the raid in fifteen days.—We can do damage enough to employ the Yankees thirty days in rebuilding the road. When nearly completed, we can make another raid, and destroy it again, repeating the operation as often as he rebuilds. He cannot keep an army in Atlanta or near it, under such conditions. How then is he to prevent our destruction of his road? He cannot defend the road between Kingston and Chattanooga, without leaving Atlanta, and putting his army between Kingston and Rome. This involves the abandonment of Atlanta. But this is not all. If he puts his army between Kingston and Chattanooga we can then strike it in Will's Valley, near Bridgeport, and destroy it there. He cannot defend all points at once. Even on the road from Kingston to Chattanooga, he cannot defend all points. If he divides his army between several points, thus divided it cannot resist. If he masses it at Kingston, we can strike the road near Dalton. If he masses his army at Dalton, we can strike the road near Kingston and so on. Neither dispersion nor concentration will avail him. And the advantages of this position and plan on our part are great and obvious. We make the Yankee abandon Atlanta, which he has so dearly won and which he prizes so highly. We put him on the defensive, the weakest of all polices, and keep him so. He has come for conquest, and must move forward and aggress. When he is driven to the defensive he is beaten. Our line is perpendicular to his, and opposite to the centre of his line from Bridgeport to Atlanta. We can strike any part of his line for 170 miles.

There is but a small difference in the distance from our base to any part of his line. Our line being perpendicular to his, only one point of it, the terminus, is exposed, and our army covers that. He cannot reach it without encountering our army. If he had Blue Mountain he could not hold it for twenty days for want of supplies. It was in view of these considerations, that, before the fall of Atlanta, I proposed the Blue Mountain line of operations as the true one.—Your columns attest the fact that I did this on the 8th of August, and nearly a month before the fall of Atlanta. I urged it again on the 14th of September, shortly after the fall of Atlanta. On the 29th September the plan was executed by "the powers that be." For the reasons which I have thus minutely detailed, Blue Mountain is our best and most safest line of operations. For these reasons I believe that it will, of necessity, be the theatre of war during the ensuing winter. It is important that the railroad be extended about 20 miles further. This can easily be done, as the road is already graded, and iron can be brought from the Georgia roads. Congress, or not waiting for the meeting of Congress, the President should have this done immediately. It is not too late to foreclose that the new lines to which the war has shifted, and may shift, render our possession of Mobile a question of paramount importance. If Mobile falls, we cannot use the Mobile and Ohio road as a base. The fall of Mobile would open the Alabama, Warrior and Bigbee rivers to the enemy, and lay the best portions of Alabama open to the enemy. It would then be difficult even to hold Selma, the other terminus of our road. It would require an army to do it. The fall of Mobile would very probably drive our army from this line of operations. Mobile has thus become a point of the highest energetic value. It must be held at all hazards and to the last extremity.

Such, then, is the situation, and such the possibilities of the future. I am merely giving my speculations. I have no knowledge of the plans of our leaders. I only think for self. I have no knowledge of facts that are not patent to all. Any man who has a map, and who understands the science of war, has all the means of making up opinions that I have. I am telling no secrets to the enemy. He knows all this as well as I do. If anybody flatters me by saying that Sherman GIVES UP at my suggestions, I have only to say, that if my opinions are so valuable as to be adopted by the greatest of Yankee Generals, then my own government had better appreciate them more highly than it does.

I advise your readers to lay this letter aside for ninety days, then re-read it and see how it has been verified by events.

There are many rumors from the front of a fight at Rome, in which some of our Generals are reported killed. They are not reliable. But it is certain that Sherman has attacked a part of our force near Rome and got the best of it.

BEN LANE.

AUCTION AND PRIVATE SALES.

At Auction,

ON SATURDAY, 29TH OCTOBER, 1864, WE WILL sell

ONE BUCKAWAY AND HARNESS, NEARLY NEW.

TUCKER, ANDREWS & CO.,
Oct 26-3t Auc. and Com. Merchants.

BAGGAGE At Auction!

AT AUCTION ON TUESDAY (SATURDAY) AT 11 o'clock, we will sell a magnificent lot of unclaimed BAGGAGE from the R. C. Railroad.

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ON THURSDAY NEXT, AT 12 O'CLOCK, IN FRONT of our store, we will sell, to the highest bidder,

A VALUABLE NEGRO BOY,

twenty-one years old, strong and likely.

CREECH & LITCHFORD,
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6 BACKS OF PRIME VIRGINIA SALT, OR WILL exchange one bushel of Salt for three bushels of NEW CORN, both Corn and Salt delivered at my Mills, on Neuse River.

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Apply to W. R. RICHARDSON.
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WRAPPING PAPER FOR SALE. APPLY AT Progress office. Sept 19-tf

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TEN SHARES OF STOCK IN BANK OF CAPE Fear.

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2,000 LBS. SUPERIOR BONE BLACK FOR SALE.

THE ABOVE ARTICLE IS USED FOR THE MANufacture of Blacking and black painting of every kind. Railroad Companies would do well to purchase it to paint Engines and Cars with. It is equal in quality to Patent Black. A. JOHNSON,
Sept 5-dtf Raleigh, N. C.

TO GAS CONSUMERS.

ON AND AFTER THE 1ST OF NOVEMBER, THE price of Gas will be $20 per thousand feet. At the present price of coals, freights and iron, it costs the Company $30.50 per thousand feet to make it.

Oct 20-dtd WATERHOUSE & BOWES.

$50 REWARD.

STRAYED OR STOLEN FROM MY PREMISES, near Morrisville, N. C., a BLACK MARE MULE, one year old last spring; has a white nose—tail and mane untrimmed. Said mule disappeared the last of June or the first of July. The above reward will be paid for her delivery to me or for information so that I can get her.

Oct 6-dtd&w2m* CALVIN D. EDWARDS.

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CONSTANTLY ON HAND AND FOR SALE. Highest market price paid for Beeswax and Tallow.

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